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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress created the Federal Circuit, its central purpose was to 
promote uniformity and certainty of legal doctrines in patent law.1 However, 
since its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit has been the subject of many 
criticisms.2 Recently, the Supreme Court has joined in this criticism. In the 
Federal Circuit’s first fifteen years, the Supreme Court stayed largely out of 
its way and only heard eight cases involving patent issues.3 However, 
according to a 2013 study, the Supreme Court has since heard twenty-eight 
patent cases, and in 80 percent of them has “reversed, vacated, modified, or 
otherwise seriously questioned the Federal Circuit’s approach.”4 This recent 
Supreme Court involvement in patent law leaves critics to believe the 
Federal Circuit needs some sort of reform.5 Specifically, critics, including 
the Supreme Court, believe that the Federal Circuit adopts specific patent 
rules that deviate from traditional general legal principles.6 Additionally, 
critics believe the Federal Circuit has a pro-patent bias, which would favor 
patent holders’ policy considerations over those of non-patent holders.7 
Lastly, critics also believe the Federal Circuit fails to adequately address 
policy considerations.8 
After the increased Supreme Court involvement in patent law in recent 
years, has the Federal Circuit learned from the Supreme Court’s guidance 
and become more consistent with traditional legal principles and Congress’ 
intended policy objectives? This article will explore this issue in light of the 
Federal Circuit’s recent holding in Sandoz v. Amgen on remand. 
The Supreme Court recently issued its landmark decision in Sandoz v. 
Amgen, primarily interpreting the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) of 
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”).9 Section 
262(l)(2)(A) provides that when an applicant submits an application to the 
FDA for approval of a biosimilar product, the applicant must provide certain 
 
 1. NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION, SHOULD PATENT JURISDICTION BE REMOVED FROM THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND RETURNED TO REGIONAL COURTS OF APPEAL? REPORTS 
OF THE COMMITTEE ON PATENTS AND COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS 2 (2015) [hereinafter “NY Bar 
Report”]. 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. Id. at 4 (citing Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent Adjudication: The 
Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505, 509–10 (2013)).  
 4. Id. (citing Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 509–10).  
 5. Id.  
6. Id. at 8. 
7. Id. at 7–8. 
8. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 809 (2008). 
 9. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017). See Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2010) [hereinafter “BPCIA”]. 
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initial disclosures to the sponsor of the reference product.10 The Supreme 
Court held that noncompliance under § 262(l)(2)(A) was not enforceable by 
injunction under federal law and ordered the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) to determine on remand whether noncompliance 
under § 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA was enforceable by injunction under state 
law.11 On December 14, 2017, the Federal Circuit issued its decision on 
remand and held that noncompliance under § 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA was 
also not enforceable by injunction under state law.12 However, did the 
Federal Circuit get it right? 
This article begins by providing a background describing the BPCIA 
generally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoz v. Amgen, and the Federal 
Circuit’s decision on remand. The article then evaluates the Federal Circuit’s 
decision on remand and discusses whether the Federal Circuit correctly 
found BPCIA preemption. Specifically, this article will discuss whether the 
Federal Circuit’s finding of BPCIA preemption remained consistent with 
traditional legal principles of preemption and with Congress’ underlying 
policy concerns behind the BPCIA. 
After this analysis, this article will conclude that the Federal Circuit did 
stay consistent with traditional legal principles of preemption. To support 
these conclusions, this article will discuss how the Federal Circuit correctly 
applied the law from traditional field and conflict preemption cases to find 
that the field of patent law is generally a federal matter and that state law 
remedies would conflict with the federal objectives in the BPCIA. Finally, 
this article will conclude that the Federal Circuit also stayed consistent with 
Congress’ underlying policy concerns in the BPCIA. In reaching this 
conclusion, the article will discuss how the Federal Circuit considered 
Congress’ underlying policy concerns in the BPCIA, to balance the interests 
of pioneer biologics companies and biosimilar applicants, and ruled in a way 
so as to maintain this balance. Thus, it appears that, at least in Sandoz v. 
Amgen, the Federal Circuit is “learning its lessons” and considering 
traditional legal principles and policy concerns. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Brief Introduction of the BPCIA 
In the 1980s, Congress was challenged with addressing the opposing 
concerns raised by the pharmaceutical industry and the general public that 
 
 10. Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1670–71.  
 11. Id. at 1675–76.  
 12. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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needed cheaper drugs. As further explained later in this article, Congress 
needed to find a way to “encourage innovation in pharmaceutical research” 
while also helping provide the general public with access to “lower-cost” or 
“generic” drugs.13 In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act (commonly known as the “Hatch-Waxman 
Act”) to address these conflicting concerns.14 Even though the Hatch-
Waxman Act only applied to non-biologic15 drugs, it provided Congress with 
a model to adopt for biologic drugs.16 In the 1990s, Congress began their 
efforts to harmonize the non-biologic and biologic drug laws.17 After years 
of work, in 2010, Congress passed the BPCIA to establish a “biosimilars 
pathway balancing innovation and consumer interests.”18 Like the Hatch-
Waxman Act before it, the BPCIA was a compromise between the competing 
interests of the pioneer biologics companies and the general public. To 
encourage innovation, the BPCIA gave pioneer biologic companies a 12-
year period of exclusivity on their drugs in order to recoup costs and make a 
profit.19 To lower consumer drug prices, the BPCIA created an abbreviated 
pathway for FDA approval of biosimilars.20 Thus, in passing the BPCIA, 
Congress reached yet another compromise, this time between the competing 
interests of the pioneer biologics companies and the general public. 
As previously stated, the BPCIA provides an abbreviated pathway for 
obtaining FDA approval of a biosimilar drug. A biosimilar drug is a 
“biologic product that is highly similar to a biologic product that has already 
been approved by the [FDA].”21 The already approved biologic product is 
referred to as the “reference product.”22 The pioneer biologic company that 
created the reference product is referred to as the “sponsor” company.23 
 
 13. Allen M. Sokal & Bart A. Gerstenblith, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Encouraging Innovation and 
Generic Drug Competition, FINNEGAN (2010), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/the-hatch-
waxman-act-encouraging-innovation-and-generic-drug.html. 
 14. Id.  
 15. A non-biologic drug is a traditional drug that is “typically synthesized from chemicals,” whereas 
a biologic drug is a type of drug “derived from natural, biological sources such as animals or 
microorganisms.” Sandoz Inc.,137 S. Ct. at 1669–70. 
 16. Krista Hessler Carver, et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 672 (2010).  
 17. Id. at 687. 
 18. BPCIA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7001(b), 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010).  
 19. Richard Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents under the Biologics 
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, N.Y.U. LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPERS 285, 
286 (2011). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1669 (2017). 
 22. Id. at 1666. 
 23. Id. 
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To obtain FDA approval of a biosimilar drug, the applicant must follow 
the pathway provided in § 262(k) of the BPCIA.24 Additionally, the applicant 
must follow § 262(l)(2)(A) and § 262(l)(8)(A) of the BPCIA, which are at 
issue in this case and explained further below.25 If the applicant fails to 
follow these requirements, then the sponsor may immediately bring an action 
for declaratory judgment of infringement, validity, or enforceability of a 
patent.26 
Sandoz & Amgen Dispute Background 
Turning to the Sandoz v. Amgen case, Neupogen, a filgrastim product 
used to stimulate the production of white blood cells, is the reference product 
marketed by Amgen.27 Amgen is the pioneer sponsor and patent holder for 
patents on methods of manufacturing and using filgrastim.28 Sandoz is a 
competitor that sought FDA approval to market a biosimilar filgrastim 
product named Zarxio.29 The FDA notified Sandoz that its application had 
been accepted for review, and the following day Sandoz notified Amgen of 
the submitted application and its intent to market Zarxio immediately after 
receiving FDA approval.30 Later, Sandoz notified Amgen that it did not 
intend to provide the application materials and manufacturing information 
required by § 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA.31 Amgen sued Sandoz for patent 
infringement and “unlawful” conduct in violation of California’s unfair 
competition law based on the following two BPCIA violations: (1) for not 
providing the application materials and manufacturing information as 
required by § 262(l)(2)(A), and (2) for violating the notice of commercial 
marketing requirement under                 § 262(l)(8)(A).32 Amgen sought 
injunctions to enforce both BPCIA requirements.33 While the case was 
pending, the FDA licensed Zarxio and Sandoz provided Amgen further 
notice of commercial marketing.34 
The District Court granted partial judgment on the pleadings to Sandoz 
on the BPCIA counterclaims and dismissed Amgen’s state-law unfair 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1672–73. 
 28. Id. at 1673.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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competition claims.35 The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Amgen’s 
state-law claim based on § 262(l)(2)(A), holding that “Sandoz did not violate 
the BPCIA in failing to disclose its application and manufacturing 
information” and that the BPCIA provides the exclusive remedies for failure 
to comply with this requirement.36 The court also held that under § 
262(l)(8)(A), an applicant must provide notice of commercial marketing 
after obtaining licensure, and that this requirement is mandatory.37 The court 
then enjoined Sandoz from marketing Zarxio until 180 days after it provided 
its second notice.38 Both parties petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which the 
Federal Circuit denied.39 Sandoz then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
in the Supreme Court regarding the              § 262(l)(8)(A) requirement.40 
Amgen then filed a conditional cross-petition for writ of certiorari regarding 
the § 262(l)(2)(A) requirement and whether the sole remedy was that 
provided under § 262(l)(9)(C).41 The Supreme Court subsequently granted 
both petitions and consolidated the cases in Sandoz v. Amgen.42 
The Supreme Court’s Decision in Sandoz v. Amgen 
The first portion of the BPCIA at issue in this case is § 262(l)(2)(A), 
which provides that, when an applicant submits an application to the FDA 
for approval of a biosimilar product, the applicant must provide its 
application materials and manufacturing information to the sponsor of the 
reference product within 20 days of notification from the FDA that the 
application has been accepted for review.43 The Supreme Court addressed 
whether the requirement under § 262(l)(2)(A) is enforceable by injunction 
under federal law. In answering this question, the Supreme Court focused 
solely on the text of § 262. Specifically, the Court looked to the provisions 
in § 262 that provided remedies.44 First, the Court looked to § 262(l)(9)(C), 
which provided a remedy for when an applicant failed to comply with the  § 
262(l)(2)(A) application and manufacturing information disclosure 
requirements.45 Section 262(l)(9)(C) authorizes the sponsor to bring an 
immediate declaratory judgment action for infringement when an applicant 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1319–20. 
 43. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1669 (2017). See BPCIA, 42 U.S.C.§ 262(l)(2)(A). 
 44. Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1675. 
 45. Id. 
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fails to comply with § 262(l)(2)(A).46 The Court concluded that by explicitly 
providing the remedy in § 262(l)(9)(C), Congress implicitly excluded all 
other federal remedies, including injunctive relief.47 In holding this, the 
Court found, “when Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, 
it knew how to do so and did so expressly.”48 Thus, the Court inferred from 
the text that Congress only intended to provide the declaratory judgment 
remedy in § 262(l)(9)(C) for failure to comply with    § 262(l)(2)(A), and if 
Congress wanted to provide injunctive relief, then it would have done so 
expressly. In holding this, the Court found                   § 262(l)(2)(A) was not 
enforceable by injunction under federal law. 
The Supreme Court also addressed whether the requirement under      § 
262(l)(2)(A) is enforceable by injunction under state law. In answering this 
question, the Court looked to the parties’ briefs, which “frame this issue as 
whether the § 262(l)(2)(A) requirement is mandatory in all circumstances . . 
. or merely a condition precedent to the information exchange process.”49 
The Court reasoned that if this requirement was only a “condition 
precedent,” then the applicant can withhold this information without 
committing an “unlawful” act.50 The Court then concluded that this issue did 
not present a question of federal law because there was no dispute over how 
the federal scheme worked.51 Rather, the Court concluded that whether this 
requirement was mandatory or conditional “only mattered for the purposes 
of California’s unfair competition law, which penalizes ‘unlawful’ 
conduct.”52 Thus, the Court held this was a state-law question and that the 
Federal Circuit, on remand, should decide if this conduct was “unlawful” 
under California law.53 Lastly, the Court held the Federal Circuit should also 
decide whether the BPCIA preempts any additional state law remedies for 
failure to comply with § 262(l)(2)(A).54 The Federal Circuit’s holdings on 
remand will be discussed in the following section of this article. 
The second portion of the BPCIA at issue in this case was                   § 
262(l)(8)(A), which provides that the applicant must provide a 180-day 
notice to the sponsor of the reference product before the date of the first 
commercial marketing of the biosimilar product.55 The Supreme Court 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979)). 
 49. Id. at 1676. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1666. See BPCIA, 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A). 
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addressed whether the applicant must give notice to the sponsor after, rather 
than before, obtaining a license from the FDA for its biosimilar. The Court 
found that the applicant may provide notice to the sponsor either before or 
after receiving FDA approval.56 This means the applicant can give notice 
before FDA approval, starting the 180-day clock, and begin commercial 
marketing immediately after FDA approval so long as the 180 days has run. 
Essentially, this means the sponsor’s commercial marketing exclusivity 
period could be cut 180-days shorter than it would have been if notice was 
required after FDA approval. 
However, as previously stated, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoz 
v. Amgen did not answer all the issues raised. One question, whether the 
requirement under § 262(l)(2)(A) that an applicant provide its application 
and manufacturing information to the sponsor of the reference product is 
enforceable by injunction under state law, was not answered by the Court 
and was sent back to the Federal Circuit to answer on remand. This question 
necessarily raised an issue for the Federal Circuit to answer on remand: 
whether the BPCIA preempts any additional state law remedies for failure to 
comply with § 262(l)(2)(A). This issue is the main focus of the remaining 
sections of this article. 
The Federal Circuit’s Decision on Remand 
The main issue the Federal Circuit addressed on remand was whether 
the BPCIA preempts state law remedies for failure to comply with              § 
262(l)(2)(A). Before deciding this issue, the Federal Circuit addressed 
whether Sandoz waived its preemption defense. The court decided to 
exercise its discretion and to address preemption, even though Sandoz did 
not argue the preemption defense before the District Court, reasoning that 
preemption in this case was “a significant question [] of general impact or of 
great public concern.”57 Lastly, in deciding this preemption issue, the Federal 
Circuit applied its own law.58 
In addressing preemption, the Federal Circuit first looked to the 
Supremacy Clause, which states that federal law “shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land.”59 Under the Supremacy Clause, state law can be preempted 
through express preemption, field preemption, or conflict preemption.60 
 
 56. Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1677. 
 57. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Hall v. Bed Bath & 
Beyond, Inc., 705 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
 58. Id. at 1325–26.  
 59. Id. at 1326 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
 60. Id.  
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Express preemption is “a question of congressional intent and when 
Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language.”61 
However, express preemption was not the issue in this appeal since the 
BPCIA does not explicitly state Congress’ intent to preempt state law.62 Field 
preemption occurs when state law is preempted because “it regulates conduct 
in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy 
exclusively.”63 This congressional intent for field preemption can be inferred 
from a “scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” or 
where an Act of Congress “touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is 
so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement 
of state laws on the same subject.”64 If field preemption applies because 
Congress intended federal law to occupy an entire field, then “even 
complementary state regulation is impermissible.”65 Conflict preemption 
occurs when state laws conflict with federal law.66 This happens when “it is 
impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal 
requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”67 The Federal 
Circuit then concluded that both field and conflict preemption were present 
in this case.68 
In finding that field preemption was present, the Federal Circuit noted 
that patent litigation is not a field in which the States have traditionally 
occupied.69 In finding this, the court reasoned that “patents are ‘inherently 
federal in character’ because a patent ‘originates from, is governed by, and 
terminates according to federal law.’”70 Further, the court noted that 
Congress granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases relating to 
patents.71 The court also noted that the FDA has “exclusive authority to 
license biosimilars.”72 Comparing this case to the field preemption found in 
Arizona v. United States, the court found that “the scheme here is 
 
 61. Id. (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990)). 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 79). 
 64. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 65. Id. (quoting Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012)).  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 79).  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 1327. 
 70. Id. (citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001) (quoting Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))). 
 71. Id. (citing Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 253 (2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2011))).  
 72. Id.  
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‘comprehensive’ and ‘provide[s] a full set of standards governing’ the 
exchange of information in biosimilar patent litigation, ‘including the 
punishment for noncompliance.’”73 Further, the court found that “BPCIA’s 
comprehensive, carefully calibrated ‘scheme of federal regulation . . . [is] so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for 
the States to supplement it.’”74 Thus, in so finding this, the court found field 
preemption applied. 
The Federal Circuit also found that conflict preemption was present. 
The court noted that Amgen sought state law injunctive relief, even though 
injunctive relief was not present in federal law through the BPCIA, and cited 
the Supreme Court’s holding that “[b]ecause § 262(l)(9)(C) provides the 
exclusive federal remedy for failure to comply with § 262(l)(2)(A), federal 
law does not permit injunctive relief or damages for such failure.”75 The 
court then cited Arizona again in finding that “[p]ermitting the State to 
impose its own penalties for the [alleged violation of federal law] here would 
conflict with the careful framework Congress adopted.”76 Thus, the court 
held that there was also conflict preemption because there was no federal 
injunctive relief under the BPCIA. To allow state law to provide injunctive 
relief would “clash” with Congress’ intent behind the BPCIA.77 
III. EVALUATING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S FINDING OF BPCIA 
PREEMPTION 
Consistency with Traditional Preemption Principles 
Looking to the Federal Circuit’s decision, I will now discuss whether 
the Federal Circuit correctly decided this issue in terms of traditional 
preemption principles. Specifically, I will discuss whether the Federal 
Circuit appears to remain consistent with the general legal principles 
regarding preemption, or rather, is making the type of specialized rules for 
patent law for which it is often criticized. Since the Federal Circuit decided 
the case on field and conflict preemption grounds, I will focus on those two 
grounds. 
As described above, Article VI of the Constitution contains the 
Supremacy Clause, which provides that the “[l]aws of the United States . . .” 
 
 73. Id. (quoting Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012)).  
 74. Id. at 1328 (citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).  
 75. Id. (citing Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1675 (2017)). 
 76. Id. at 1328 (citing Arizona, 567 U.S. at 402). 
 77. Id. at 1329. 
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(i.e. federal law) “shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.”78 As a result of 
this federal supremacy, “States have no power . . . to retard, impede, burden, 
or in any manner control the operations of the Constitutional laws enacted 
by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the [Federal] 
Government.”79 Further, “[A]cts of the State Legislatures . . . [that] interfere 
with, or are contrary to the laws of the Congress [are to be invalidated 
because] [i]n every such case, the act of Congress . . . is supreme; and the 
law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, 
must yield to it.”80 So, when there is a conflict between federal and state law, 
the federal law controls and invalidates the state law because federal law is 
supreme. 
The difficulty, however, is in deciding whether a particular state or local 
law conflicts with federal law and requires preemption. The Supreme Court 
gave some guidance to this inquiry in Gade v. National Solid Wastes 
Management Association: 
 
Preemption may be either express or implied and is compelled 
whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s 
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. Absent 
explicit preemptive language, we have recognized at least two types 
of implied preemption: field preemption, where the scheme of federal 
regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, and conflict 
preemption, where compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility, or where state law stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.81 
 
Unfortunately, Congress is rarely clear about its intent for preemption 
to apply or the scope of what is preempted.82 As a result, courts must interpret 
Congress’ intent and decide what is preempted as “‘[t]he purpose of 
Congress is the ‘ultimate touchstone’ in every preemptive case.”83 However, 
“although the Court purports to be finding congressional intent, it often is 
left to make guesses about purpose based on fragments of statutory language, 
 
 78. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 79. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819).  
 80. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824).  
 81. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (internal citations omitted). 
 82. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 453 (Wolters Kluwer, 5th ed. 2017). 
 83. Id. (citing Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retain Clerks v. 
Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))). 
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random statements in the legislative history, and the degree of detail of the 
federal regulation.”84 
Applying the Court’s guidance in Gade to this case, the Federal Circuit 
was correct in concluding only field and conflict preemption apply here.85 
First, looking at the BPCIA, there is no express preemption language; thus, 
implied preemption is the only possibility. 
Looking first at field preemption, the Federal Circuit appeared to follow 
the correct general legal principles. Field preemption is a type of implied 
preemption where the federal regulation is “so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.”86 In other words, “the federal interest is so dominant that the 
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the 
same subject.”87 Field preemption has been found in a number of situations. 
For example, in Hines v. Davidowitz and Arizona v. United States, the 
Supreme Court found field preemption in the immigration law context.88 In 
Hines, the Court found the alien registration system was enacted by Congress 
to create one uniform national registration system, and state law could not 
be enforced when it interfered with this federal regulation.89 The Court 
emphasized that alien registration “is in a field which affects international 
relations,” so it “demand[ed] broad national authority.”90 The Court also 
emphasized the “extensive federal regulation in immigration, including a 
‘broad and comprehensive plan describing the terms and conditions upon 
which aliens may enter this country’” and the fact that aliens were required 
to register with the federal government.91 
Like immigration, patents are usually a matter of federal law, not state 
law.92 The United States pointed out in its Amicus brief that “[w]hile 
Congress has not occupied the field of patent law or intellectual property law 
more generally . . . Congress has occupied the field of federal patent 
litigation.”93 Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent law 
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claims, and state courts are expressly barred from hearing these claims.94 
Additionally, federal laws and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern 
the “presentation of patent claims and defenses.”95 For these reasons, it 
appears the “federal interest is so dominant” in federal patent litigation so as 
to “preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,” and the scheme 
of federal patent litigation regulation is “so pervasive as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”96 
Congress’ occupation of federal patent litigation is the an important 
consideration supporting a finding that patent law is usually within the field 
of federal law. 
Also, like obtaining citizenship and alien registration in immigration 
law, patents can only be obtained and registered by the federal government. 
Further, Congress created many patent laws that provide a “broad and 
comprehensive plan describing the terms and conditions” upon which one 
may obtain a patent.97 Congress’ rules and regulations for obtaining patents 
is another factor supporting a finding that patent law is usually within the 
field of federal law. 
So, it appears that, in general, patent law is usually within the field of 
federal law. However, this case is about biosimilars and the BPCIA 
specifically. Like the regulation in Hines, the BPCIA appears to be an 
“extensive federal regulation” with a “broad and comprehensive plan” for 
obtaining FDA approval of biosimilars.98 The Supreme Court expressly 
recognized this and also found that the BPCIA created a “carefully calibrated 
scheme” for adjudicating patent infringement claims between sponsors and 
applicants.99 These reasons support an inference that the “federal interest is 
so dominant” in biosimilar litigation so as to “preclude enforcement of state 
laws on the same subject,” and the scheme of biosimilar litigation regulation 
is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no 
room for the States to supplement it.”100 Thus, it appears that the BPCIA, 
like patent law generally, is likely within the field of federal law. 
Comparing this analysis to the Federal Circuit’s analysis in this case (as 
described in the previous section of this article), the analysis looks almost 
identical. The Federal Circuit first looked to the field preemption principles 
as described in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. The Federal Circuit then 
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recognized that patent litigation is solely governed by federal law, that 
patents are solely obtained by the federal government, and that biosimilars 
are governed by the federal government through the FDA. The Federal 
Circuit then looked to the BPCIA and found it was “comprehensive” like the 
schemes in Arizona and Hines. Thus, the Federal Circuit appears to have 
stuck strictly to the general legal principles regarding field preemption and 
has “got it right” in terms of field preemption. 
Next, turning to conflict preemption, the Federal Circuit again appears 
to have followed the correct general legal principles. Conflict preemption is 
a type of implied preemption where “there is a conflict between federal and 
state law . . . even if federal law does not expressly preempt state law, 
preemption will be found where ‘compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility.’”101 In other words, conflict 
preemption is found where state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”102 Conflict preemption has been found in a number of situations. 
For instance, in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Supreme 
Court found conflict preemption in the environmental law context.103 In 
International Paper Co., the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants for 
alleged pollution under Vermont’s common law of nuisance.104 The 
defendants argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”) preempted the common law nuisance suit.105 In finding conflict 
preemption, the Supreme Court stated: 
 
In determining whether Vermont nuisance law “stands as an 
obstacle” to the full implementation of the CWA, it is not enough to 
say that the ultimate goal of both federal and state law is to eliminate 
water pollution. A state law is also preempted if it interferes with the 
methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach this 
goal.106 
 
The Supreme Court then found conflict preemption because the 
Vermont law would allow the plaintiffs to circumvent a system under the 
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CWA, thus, “upsetting the balance of public and private interests so carefully 
addressed” by the CWA.107 
Like International Paper Co., allowing state law to apply concurrently 
with federal law in the biosimilar context would upset the “balance of public 
and private interests so carefully addressed” by Congress in the BPCIA.108 
Before the case went to the Supreme Court,109 the Federal Court found that 
the initial disclosures under § 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA were optional.110 
In other words, Congress provided in the BPCIA a choice for applicants.111 
If applicants choose to not make initial disclosures under       § 262(l)(2)(A) 
of the BPCIA, then that does not violate the BPCIA and is, rather, “a path 
expressly contemplated by the BPCIA.”112 However, if state law mandates 
these initial disclosures under § 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA, then this would 
be “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”113 Specifically, this state law would be depriving 
applicants of the option to make initial disclosures under § 262(l)(2)(A) of 
the BPCIA, which would be obstructing “a path expressly contemplated by 
[Congress in enacting] the BPCIA.”114 Thus, “state law would obstruct [one 
of] the BPCIA’s purposes and objectives.”115 Further, if state law applied 
and was able to mandate these disclosures, that adds a burden to applicants, 
which would upset the “balance of public and private interests so carefully 
addressed” by Congress in the BPCIA.116 For these reasons, federal 
preemption should apply since state law conflicts with federal law in regard 
to the initial disclosures under § 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA. 
Similarly, Congress “imposed short and fixed statutory time limits on 
each of the prescribed steps in 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2) through (l)(6), leading 
to the commencement of patent litigation no more than roughly 250 days 
after FDA accepts the applicant’s biosimilar application for review.”117 If 
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sponsors were able to also sue under state law, which would likely be long 
and drawn-out litigation, this would undermine Congress’ goal in the BPCIA 
to “expedit[e] the resolution of biosimilar patent disputes.”118 Thus, state law 
would obstruct one of the BPCIA’s purposes and objectives.119 Again, this 
would add another burden on the applicants, which would upset the “balance 
of public and private interests so carefully addressed” by Congress in the 
BPCIA.120 For these reasons, federal preemption should apply since state law 
conflicts with federal law in regard to the “short and fixed statutory time 
limits” of the BPCIA, which were designed to quickly resolve biosimilar 
patent disputes.121 
Likewise, the Supreme Court in Sandoz v. Amgen found that Congress 
intended the remedies under the BPCIA to be the sole remedies for 
noncompliance with the initial disclosures under § 262(l)(2)(A).122 If 
injunction were allowed in state court, that would constitute an additional 
remedy not provided by Congress in the BPCIA.123 If sponsors were able to 
sue in state court for injunction, this would undermine Congress’ goal in the 
BPCIA to provide the exclusive remedies for noncompliance. Thus, state law 
would obstruct one of the BPCIA’s purposes and objectives.124 Again, this 
would add another burden on the applicants, upsetting the balance of 
interests considered by Congress in the BPCIA.125 For these reasons, federal 
preemption should apply since state law conflicts with federal law in regard 
to the BPCIA’s exclusive remedies for noncompliance.126 
Comparing this analysis to the Federal Circuit’s analysis in this case, 
the Federal Circuit focuses only on the issue of injunction conflicts. 
However, even though the Federal Circuit did not discuss the initial 
disclosures conflicts under the BPCIA or the litigation time limits conflicts 
under the BPCIA, the Federal Circuit’s discussion of injunction conflicts 
appears to be correct. Specifically, like the analysis described above, the 
Federal Circuit found the BPCIA exclusively provided remedies for 
noncompliance, so allowing state law injunction would “interfere with the 
careful balance struck by Congress.”127 Thus, the Federal Circuit appears to 
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have stuck to the general legal principles regarding conflict preemption and 
has “got it right” in terms of conflict preemption. 
Therefore, the Federal Circuit appears to remain consistent with the 
general legal principles regarding preemption, rather than making 
specialized rules for patent law. Perhaps this means that the Federal Circuit, 
at least in Sandoz v. Amgen, has “learned its lesson” that the Supreme Court 
has been teaching for the past decade and is staying more consistent with 
general legal principles. 
Consistency with the BPCIA’s Underlying Policy Concerns 
Looking to the Federal Circuit’s decision, I will now discuss whether 
the Federal Circuit correctly decided this issue in terms of policy concerns. 
Specifically, I will discuss whether the Federal Circuit appears to remain 
consistent with Congress’ policy goals behind the BPCIA. To analyze this, I 
will first provide a background to the policy Congress considered in enacting 
the BPCIA. 
An underlying concern behind the Hatch-Waxman Act and the BPCIA 
was the pioneer companies’ fear that they do not have enough time for 
exclusivity on the market because of how long it took to get FDA approval 
before a drug could go on the market.128 To ensure ample protection, pioneer 
companies filed patent applications while the drugs were still in 
development.129 This meant the duration of patent protection began to run 
before the drugs had even completed development and reached the market.130 
Thus, by the time the drugs reached the market, pioneer companies had 
already lost significant time to sell their products exclusively. In other words, 
these companies had lost significant time to recoup their development costs 
and make a profit before their patent protection expired and generics could 
enter the market. Logically, if pioneer companies could not recoup their costs 
and make a profit, the incentive to create new drugs would be diminished. 
This desire to continue to encourage innovative research and development 
was one of the competing concerns Congress faced in passing the Hatch-
Waxman Act and the BPCIA.131 
However, there also existed the opposing concern to help generic drugs 
reach the market more quickly, which would provide the public with lower-
cost drugs.132 Before a generic drug could enter the market, the law required 
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proof that the new drug was safe, effective, and accepted by the FDA.133 
Additionally, clinical trials were required to get FDA approval, which took 
considerable time and money.134 Yet, in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co., the Federal Circuit held that tests for FDA approval of 
a generic drug infringed the patent on the branded drug.135 Since the patent 
had to expire before testing, and testing a drug and getting FDA approval 
could take years, there was an extended amount of time of exclusivity of the 
brand drug on the market.136 As a result, this brand drug enjoyed extended 
exclusivity on the market allowing the pioneer company to keep the prices 
high, meaning the public was not able to benefit from lower-cost generic 
drugs for years. This public need for lower-cost generic drugs was the other 
competing concern Congress faced in passing the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
the BPCIA.137 
The Hatch-Waxman Act and the BPCIA addressed these competing 
concerns by essentially drafting a compromise. For pioneer companies, the 
two laws provided various favorable protections, such as patent term 
extensions to compensate for the delay caused by FDA review and market 
exclusivities prohibiting the submission and/or approval of a new drug 
application for a given amount of time.138 The two laws also provided various 
favorable protections for generic drug manufacturers, such as abbreviated 
new drug applications that did not require preclinical and clinical safety and 
efficacy testing and a “safe harbor” provision overruling Roche that allowed 
generics to test drugs for FDA approval without risk of infringement 
lawsuits.139 Therefore, by including these protections in the Hatch-Waxman 
Act and the BPCIA, Congress was able to balance the competing interests of 
the pioneer companies and the general public. 
In the BPCIA specifically, Congress established many mechanisms in 
order to maintain the balance of these competing interests. For example, to 
encourage innovation, Congress provided biologic companies a 12-year 
period of exclusivity to recoup costs and make a profit.140 On the other hand, 
to lower consumer drug prices and help biosimilars quickly reach the market, 
Congress created an abbreviated pathway for FDA approval of 
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biosimilars.141 The Sandoz v. Amgen case dealt with the particulars of this 
abbreviated pathway.142 The remaining focus of this analysis discusses 
whether the Federal Circuit remained consistent with the particulars of this 
abbreviated pathway that Congress provided, so as to stay consistent with 
the overall balance of competing interests behind the BPCIA. 
As discussed previously, the Supreme Court in Sandoz v. Amgen found 
Congress provided in the BPCIA the exclusive federal remedies that could 
be taken against biosimilar applicants for noncompliance.143 Thus, since the 
BPCIA did not provide for federal injunction, this remedy did not exist for 
applicants’ noncompliance. The Federal Circuit extended this reasoning on 
remand by finding Congress provided in the BPCIA the exclusive remedies, 
federal or state, that could be taken against biosimilar applicants for 
noncompliance.144 Thus, since the BPCIA did not provide for state 
injunction, this remedy did not exist for applicants’ noncompliance. In 
finding this, the Federal Circuit appears to have been conscious of the policy 
considerations of the BPCIA. 
First, when finding field preemption, the Federal Circuit considered 
Congress’ intent that federal law exclusively occupy the field of biosimilar 
litigation.145 In considering this, the Federal Circuit recognized Congress’ 
overarching intent behind the BPCIA: 
 
The BPCIA is a complex statutory scheme . . . that establishes 
processes both for obtaining FDA approval of biosimilars and for 
resolving patent disputes between manufacturers of licensed 
biologics and manufacturers of biosimilars. It sets forth a carefully 
calibrated scheme for preparing to adjudicate, and then adjudicating, 
claims of patent infringement. Congress established this scheme as 
part of its careful balancing of innovation and consumer interests.146 
 
Thus, the Federal Circuit recognized that Congress’ purpose behind the 
BPCIA was to balance the competing interests of pioneer sponsors and 
biosimilar applicants. After considering this overarching intent, the Federal 
Circuit went on to hold that the BPCIA was “comprehensive” and “carefully 
drafted and detailed,” so presumptively Congress would have included state 
law remedy or “left room for the States” if Congress intended biosimilar 
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litigation to not be completely within the federal law field.147 Thus, in finding 
field preemption, the Federal Circuit first considered the overarching 
Congressional intent behind the BPCIA. 
Next, when finding conflict preemption, the Federal Circuit considered 
whether state law remedies would conflict with the BPCIA’s ultimate 
objectives.148 In considering this, the Federal Circuit reflected on how 
allowing patent holders to bring state law claims, in addition to federal law 
claims, would impact biosimilar applicants.149 The Federal Circuit found 
“compliance with the BPCIA’s ‘detailed regulatory regime in the shadow of 
50 States’ tort regimes,’ and unfair competition standards, could 
‘dramatically increase the burdens’ on biosimilar applicants beyond those 
contemplated by Congress in enacting the BPCIA.”150 So, the Federal Circuit 
again considered the overarching Congressional intent behind the BPCIA, to 
balance the competing interests of pioneer sponsors and biosimilar 
applicants, and how state law remedies would disrupt this balance. The 
Federal Circuit found there would be disruption to this carefully crafted 
balance if state law and federal law remedies existed because the biosimilar 
applicants would have an added burden that Congress did not intend.151 Thus, 
the Federal Circuit found conflict preemption because state law remedies 
would conflict with the objectives of the BPCIA.152 
So, in finding field and conflict preemption, the Federal Circuit 
considered Congress’ policy concerns behind the BPCIA. Specifically, the 
Federal Circuit considered the compromise Congress struck between pioneer 
sponsors and biosimilar applicants. Further, the Federal Circuit did not 
merely consider these policy concerns, but the Federal Circuit ruled in such 
a way that maintained the careful balance Congress struck between the 
pioneer sponsors and the biosimilar applicants. If the Federal Circuit had 
ruled otherwise, the balance would have been upset in favor of sponsors and 
against biosimilar applicants who would have had additional burdens. 
Thus, it appears that the Federal Circuit has “gotten in right” in terms 
of the underlying BPCIA policy concerns. Specifically, the Federal Circuit 
appears to remain consistent with Congress’ underlying objective to balance 
the interests of the pioneer sponsors and the biosimilar applicants. Rather 
than ignore policy concerns, as critics believe the Federal Circuit has a 
history of doing, the Federal Circuit here considered these policy concerns 
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and ruled in a way that maintained Congress’ policy objectives. Perhaps this 
means that the Federal Circuit, at least in Sandoz v. Amgen and in the BPCIA 
context, has “learned its lesson” and is staying more consistent with 
Congress’ underlying policy concerns. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision makes clear that the requirement under 
§ 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA can only be enforced by the remedy provided 
in § 262(l)(9)(C) and that no federal injunctive remedy exists. The Federal 
Circuit’s decision makes clear that the requirement under § 262(l)(2)(A) of 
the BPCIA can only be enforced by the remedy provided in § 262(l)(9)(C) 
and that no state law injunctive remedy exists because of field and conflict 
preemption. After analyzing the traditional preemption principles, it appears 
the Federal Circuit correctly decided this issue. The Federal Circuit correctly 
applied the law from traditional field and conflict preemption cases to find 
that the field of patent law is generally a federal matter and that state law 
remedies would conflict with the federal objectives in the BPCIA. Lastly, 
after analyzing Congress’ underlying policy concerns in the BPCIA, it 
appears that the Federal Circuit correctly decided this issue. The Federal 
Circuit expressly considered these policy concerns in its opinion and ruled 
in a way that supported Congress’ objectives. Thus, it appears that, at least 
in Sandoz v. Amgen and in the BPCIA context, the Federal Circuit is 
“learning its lessons” and is considering traditional legal principles and 
policy concerns. 
 
